Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Below Half Is Not Gone
Published 01 SEP 2026 · Reviewed 01 SEP 2026
A layered reading of China's first-half 2026 electricity data separates generation share, output, capacity, and system use.
Understand the argument. Follow the evidence.
Evidence behind the Notebook
Search public inquiries, admitted sources, and Dispatches. Follow each source back to the publication that uses it, with its context and limitations.
Interactive evidence archive
10 inquiries · 153 sources · 13 Dispatches
Search public inquiries, sources, and Dispatches
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 01 SEP 2026 · Reviewed 01 SEP 2026
A layered reading of China's first-half 2026 electricity data separates generation share, output, capacity, and system use.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 01 SEP 2026 · Reviewed 01 SEP 2026
A shorter Arctic route raises a harder question: can seasonal sailings become dependable service? Examine the scale, operating constraints, and unresolved voyage evidence.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 01 SEP 2026 · Reviewed 01 SEP 2026
A source-audited inquiry into the separate proof gates for Canadian admission, production, USMCA qualification, certification, and entry into the United States.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 29 AUG 2026 · Reviewed 29 AUG 2026
A bounded reading of China's July 2026 industrial output, profits, retail sales, investment, property, and manufacturing survey data.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 26 AUG 2026 · Reviewed 26 AUG 2026
A source-audited inquiry into China Shock 2.0, the groups absorbing its benefits and costs, and the policy tools aimed at different parts of the adjustment.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 25 AUG 2026 · Reviewed 01 SEP 2026
A source-audited inquiry into how networked attention and national-security law shape what reaches an audience or remains publicly sayable.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Reviewed 01 SEP 2026
A source-audited field guide to China's non-Arctic chokepoint portfolio: oil inventories, bypass pipelines, tanker handoffs, Red Sea exposure, sanctions, and the limits of substitution.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 14 AUG 2026 · Reviewed 14 AUG 2026
A source-audited field guide to the dimensions of US–China power: manufacturing, technology, science, finance, military capacity, history, and demography.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 28 JUL 2026 · Reviewed 08 AUG 2026
A source-audited inquiry into the real goods, dependencies, governance, and political limits in China’s proposed international AI order.
Inquiry · Mainland Dispatch
Published 23 JUL 2026 · Reviewed 23 JUL 2026
A public research notebook on Kevin Rudd’s model of Xi Jinping: what it explains, where the evidence stops, and why 2027, 2028, and 2049 are not the same claim.
Source · Global Affairs Canada
Published 29 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published 29 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Sets the second quota period at 24,500 vehicles plus unused first-period volume, using shipment-specific permits for imports into Canada.
Limit: The notice governs Canadian admission. It does not decide Canadian production, USMCA origin, entry into the United States, or a customs violation.
Source · Global Affairs Canada Export and Import Controls System
Published 28 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published 28 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Reports 15,603 first-period quota uses and 8,897 remaining from the 24,500-vehicle maximum through August 28.
Limit: Aggregate tariff-line utilization is not a VIN-linked production record, USMCA calculation, US entry, or enforcement finding.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China
Published 27 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 27 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
The original August 27 record reports 17.6 percent comparable-basis profit growth, major industry differences, revenue and cost totals, margin, receivables, inventories, and balance-sheet measures. NBS posted its English version on August 28.
Limit: A cumulative aggregate can be concentrated by sector and affected by the comparable enterprise population. Profit, receivables, inventory, and cash flow are distinct measures.
Source · Department of Finance Canada
Published 25 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 25 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Canada announced tariffs at 15%, 25%, or 50% on C$27.6 billion of US goods, scheduled to take effect September 8, 2026.
Limit: At the August 30 review cutoff, these measures were announced but not yet effective. Later implementation requires a new source check.
Source · Hudson Institute - Simplecast
Published 25 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 25 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The RSS record identifies episode 195, an August 25, 2026 release, and a 39:23 runtime. The full publisher audio was reviewed manually and mapped to 01:53, 20:48, and 29:38 segment starts.
Limit: No Hudson or Simplecast transcript or chapter record was located through August 30. The publisher audio controls; the supplied synopsis and local audit notes are not evidence links.
Published 25 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The RSS record identifies episode 195, an August 25, 2026 release, and a 39:23 runtime. The full publisher audio was reviewed manually and mapped to 01:53, 20:48, and 29:38 segment starts.
Limit: No Hudson or Simplecast transcript or chapter record was located through August 30. The publisher audio controls; the supplied synopsis and local audit notes are not evidence links.
Source · Government of the Hong Kong SAR
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
The release identifies the defendants' dispositions, welcomes the verdict, states the government's national-security and constitutional position, and says the case was adjourned to August 28 for mitigation.
Limit: This is the executive government's position on the case, not an independent case summary and not a sentencing order.
Source · Hong Kong Judiciary - Court of First Instance
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
The 498-paragraph reasons define the charge, record the defense, reject one prosecution constitutional theory, apply Articles 22 and 23, distinguish pre-law background from post-law acts, and convict Lee, Chow, and the Alliance.
Limit: The posted judgment is in Traditional Chinese. This Notebook paraphrases the reviewed reasons and does not substitute for legal advice or an authorized English translation.
Source · Human Rights Watch
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Human Rights Watch argues that the convictions violate expression and peaceful-assembly rights, summarizes the defense position, and distinguishes the August 28 mitigation hearing from later sentencing.
Limit: This is an advocacy organization's legal and human-rights assessment; its 'vigil organizers' frame is broader than the judgment's exact charged acts.
Source · Prime Minister of Canada
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The statements document the August 21 suspension after last-minute US terms that Canada described as unfair and uneconomic. The prepared remarks emphasize flexibility, sovereignty, French language and culture, diversification, and dollar-for-dollar countertariffs.
Limit: These are Canada's official account of negotiations, not an agreed bilateral record. The prepared text does not identify a specific China clause, and it cannot establish the other side's motive.
Source · Reddit
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Supplied questions about output versus jobs, social protection, threat rhetoric, and disciplined industrial policy.
Limit: Anonymous discussion context, not evidence; no username, score, or quotation appears in public copy.
Source · The Ezra Klein Show - New York Times Opinion
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Publisher record for the guest, release date, 1:05:30 runtime, show framing, and manually audited audio passages.
Limit: The show initiates the inquiry but does not independently establish its economic claims.
Source · New York Times Opinion
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 21 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
The publisher-designated transcript destination was rechecked on the publication date.
Limit: The page remained inaccessible in review; no transcript-only claim or quotation is used.
Source · Associated Press
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
AP attributes to Maoyan about 10,000 yuan over Niu Lai's first 10 days, 8.2 million yuan on Monday August 17, nearly 300,000 admissions that day, and 17.1 million yuan cumulatively.
Limit: AP could not independently verify the separate report that two people made the film. The figures are dated, rounded, and not a final gross.
Source · Al Jazeera
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Frames the Arctic proposal against Hormuz and Suez, supporting the non-Arctic conclusion that a seasonal container service does not replace Gulf energy or Suez-scale trade.
Limit: The comparison depends partly on operator claims and does not establish a universal portfolio policy, a risk-free corridor, or substitution at equivalent scale.
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Frames the announced Arctic service as a seasonal hedge and records expert cautions about scale, ice, and Russian administration.
Limit: Schedule and transit-time details substantially trace to the operator; the report does not prove arrival, completed transit, reliable repetition, or safe passage.
Source · The Washington Post
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Advances the geopolitical argument connecting PRC-linked procurement and Russian intelligence support to Iran's military capacity.
Limit: This is an opinion essay by Foundation for Defense of Democracies authors. Its underlying factual claims are checked against Treasury and AP rather than adopted on authority.
Source · Reuters
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Reports state-linked tanker redeployment, Kpler's outside-Gulf STS estimate, vessel schedules, and freight economics.
Limit: Several central details rely on unnamed trade sources and proprietary shipping data not independently reconstructed for this Notebook.
Source · The Guardian
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
The report records the film's August 5 release, 86-minute runtime, first-10-day relegation, later 14.9 million yuan cumulative figure, and The Odyssey's 192 million yuan three-day China opening.
Limit: Those cumulative and opening-weekend figures cover different periods. The headline's 'rivals' language should not be converted into equal gross.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Supplies July and January-July coal-production and thermal-generation context after the H1 window.
Limit: Raw coal, thermal generation, coal-fired generation, capacity, consumption, and emissions are different series; July does not replace H1.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Reports July real value-added growth of 4.5 percent for industrial enterprises above the designated size, plus sector, industry, product, sales-ratio, export-delivery, coverage, and seasonal-adjustment details.
Limit: The enterprise population changes annually. Value added is a real output measure for covered industrial firms, not a measure of profits, employment, or the entire economy.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Reports 26.0328 trillion yuan in fixed investment excluding rural households, down 6.7 percent, alongside industry, ownership, regional, technology-related, coverage, and revision detail.
Limit: The series includes projects above a threshold and all property development, is not price adjusted, and uses a revised prior-year comparison base.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Reports property investment, construction, new starts, completions, new-commercial-building sales area and value, inventory, financing, regional results, coverage, and comparable-basis revisions.
Limit: The indicators are cumulative and mix monetary flows with square-meter measures. The prior-year base was revised for comparability.
Source · Reuters
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Supports the continued Gulf production and feeder leg behind some Fujairah-area transfers.
Limit: A current reported transaction pattern does not establish a permanent route architecture.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 18 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Reports 28.7744 trillion yuan in January-July retail sales, up 1.2 percent, and 3.9022 trillion yuan in July, up 0.6 percent, with area, format, category, online, coverage, and revision notes.
Limit: Retail sales cover goods and catering rather than total household consumption. Growth rates are not adjusted for prices, and the 2026 online series changed coverage.
Source · The Guardian
Published 17 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 17 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Connects the Arctic proposal to contemporary Middle East disruption while identifying why the non-Arctic chokepoints retain different energy and container functions.
Limit: Launch reporting cannot prove that China has replaced Hormuz or Suez, or that every state-linked carrier follows one route policy.
Published 17 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Reports the Arctic launch proposition alongside environmental, sanctions, insurance, and Russian-governance dependencies.
Limit: The report does not establish lower lifecycle impact, voyage completion, reliable service, or Suez-scale capacity.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China
Published 17 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 17 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Synthesizes July and January-July releases and describes stable production, employment, prices, trade, and new growth drivers while acknowledging an acute imbalance between strong supply and weak demand.
Limit: This is the publishing government's characterization of its data and policy context, not independent validation of the underlying records or causal claims.
Source · Zhoushan Municipal People's Government
Published 17 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 21 AUG 2026
Published 17 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 21 AUG 2026
Reports that Dubai Tower departed Ningbo–Zhoushan Port on August 15, after the operator's earlier weather adjustment.
Limit: The departure report does not provide AIS evidence, arrival confirmation, a completed Arctic-transit record, or proof that later weekly sailings operated.
Source · Movie Box Office - Sina
Published 16 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Published 16 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
The dated post attributes preliminary national data to the China Film Special Fund office and lists Niu Lai near 6 million yuan and The Odyssey near 65 million yuan on August 16.
Limit: This is a republished preliminary snapshot in a rolling social feed, not a stable official database table or a final audited market total.
Source · The White House
Published 13 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 13 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The report places Canada in a diversified high-risk tier, describes possible improper USMCA treatment, and distinguishes model-based, product-screen, transaction, and facility-level estimates. It gives an overall estimate range of roughly US$40 billion to US$303 billion and says the methods are not additive or directly comparable.
Limit: Its Canada passages are risk claims, not a public Canada-specific shipment determination. The report says shifted trade does not prove all displaced Chinese trade was illegally transshipped, and labels its central economic effects model-based rather than observed.
Source · US Energy Information Administration
Published 12 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 12 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Provides quarterly chokepoint flows, EIA estimates for China's combined government and commercial crude stocks, and the August disruption outlook.
Limit: China does not publish a complete inventory series; the stock values are modelled estimates and may be revised.
Source · Fresh Air · NPR
Published 12 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 12 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Supplies the question, interview framing, sector claims, demography argument, and the distinction between technological and military power. The displayed audio duration is 44:29.
Limit: NPR says transcripts may be updated and can vary from the audio. The audio is controlling; this Notebook paraphrases rather than reproducing the interview.
Source · Global Times
Published 11 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 11 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Quotes Sea Legend saying weather was changing the opening August 15 departure and that the final domestic port sequence could change because of typhoon conditions.
Limit: This is the operator's pre-departure account, not voyage-level evidence that the ship later sailed or arrived.
Source · The New Yorker
Published 10 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 10 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Provides reported factory scenes and the broader argument that industrial learning and technological power are accumulating together in China.
Limit: Reported examples, including company figures from a guided factory visit, are not treated as standardized national statistics. Numerical claims are checked elsewhere.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China and China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing
Published 01 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 01 AUG 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Reports a 49.2 manufacturing PMI, enterprise-size indexes, five headline subindexes, longer historical tables, survey definitions, coverage, and calculation method.
Limit: PMI is a seasonally adjusted diffusion index relative to the previous month, not an output-growth rate. The live page displays August 1; the August 27 candidate ledger recorded August 3.
Source · CREA and Global Energy Monitor
Published AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published AUG 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Controls the 3.4 percent coal-generation change, coal fleet flows, utilization, and 360 TWh modeled curtailment estimate.
Limit: CREA is an advocacy/research organization and GEM supplies tracker data; curtailment combines reported and modeled values and is not locally substitutable one for one.
Source · Associated Press
Published AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published AUG 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Reports a US intelligence assessment that Russia supplied information potentially useful to Iranian attacks.
Limit: The intelligence is not public; officials said it did not show Russia directing Iran's use of the information.
Source · State Council / Xinhua
Published 30 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published 30 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Provides the official English-language share, generation, renewable output, and capacity summary.
Limit: Repeats official NEA data and does not independently validate the figures or make unlike measures interchangeable.
Source · National Energy Administration
Published 30 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published 30 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Controls the official Chinese-language 49.7 percent share, 2.5 trillion kWh coal generation, and 1.95 billion kW wind-and-solar capacity figures.
Limit: Official measurement and characterization, not independent validation; the hub contains multiple records with distinct definitions.
Source · Hudson Institute · Simplecast
Published 28 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 28 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
The initiating conversation. The public page and RSS establish episode number, date, and 36:58 runtime.
Limit: No publisher transcript or chapter file was available when reviewed on July 28, 2026. Time ranges reflect the commissioned editorial review and are not presented as verbatim quotations.
Source · Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
Published 28 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 28 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Rejects a simple equation among exports, surplus, and excess capacity and emphasizes productivity, innovation, scale, and green demand.
Limit: Authoritative for the government's position, not independent adjudication of every sector or support measure.
Source · Lloyd's List
Published 27 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 27 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Provides the chronology of two COSCO-operated VLCC passages on July 23–24 and a reported withdrawal decision on July 27.
Limit: Specialist reporting may be paywalled and does not make a group-wide policy universal across chartered vessels.
Source · Council on Foreign Relations
Published 27 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 27 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Decomposes early-2026 customs data and argues that exceptional gold imports and chip prices obscure a rising manufacturing surplus.
Limit: An author's decomposition, not an official national-accounts revision.
Source · Deutsche Bundesbank
Published 27 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 27 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Estimates price competitiveness and foreign demand contributions to Germany's 2022-25 export-growth gap.
Limit: Counterfactual panel estimates exclude structural product mix and some sector costs.
Source · Associated Press
Published 26 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 26 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Supports the reported relocation of more than 801,000 Guangdong residents.
Limit: The relocation count measures mobilization scale, not forecast quality, response effectiveness, or recovery outcomes.
Source · The White House
Published 20 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 20 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The administration described three Section 338 proclamations imposing 50% duties on covered Canadian imports in response to alleged discrimination involving cars, alcohol, dairy, and other products. USTR described nearly US$20 billion in annual imports, and the effective date was moved to August 22.
Limit: The action applies regardless of USMCA origin and is not itself an origin determination or proof of Chinese transshipment.
Source · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
Published 17 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 17 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
China’s Foreign Ministry reports 29 founding signatories and Shanghai as headquarters; Reuters separately reported the signing.
Limit: The reviewed sources do not provide the complete agreement, voting rules, funding structure, enforcement arrangements, operating capacity, or governance quality.
Source · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
Published 17 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 17 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Controls the account of Xi’s stated principles and the training, cooperation-center, and MAZU commitments.
Limit: A speech establishes announced policy and rhetoric, not implementation or outcomes.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published 16 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 16 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Finds China’s refining shares above 90 percent for gallium, graphite, manganese, and rare earths, and models large downstream exposure to fully implemented controls.
Limit: The $6.5 trillion figure is a risk scenario, not observed damage. Expanded rare-earth measures were suspended for a year through November 2026.
Source · Xinde Marine News
Published 16 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 16 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Provides the eight-sailing schedule, named ships, approximate capacities, and promoted route times.
Limit: The central claims originate with the operator. A published schedule is not voyage-level evidence that every sailing departed or arrived.
Source · Reuters
Published 07 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 07 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Establishes that restrictions were reportedly under consideration and creates a future test of Xi’s openness language.
Limit: This is sourced reporting about a possible policy, not evidence of enacted restrictions.
Source · World Bank
Published 07 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 07 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Contrasts high-technology investment, exports, and policy buffers with weaker domestic demand, cautious consumers, and property adjustment; projects 4.4 percent growth for 2026.
Limit: The growth number is a full-year forecast published before the July indicator releases. The analysis depends on policy, energy, trade, and property assumptions.
Source · USTR and Global Affairs Canada
Published 01 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 01 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
USTR says the United States did not renew USMCA in its current form on July 1 but that the agreement remains in force while talks continue. Canada's readout likewise says it remains in force. The autos report separately documents vehicle rules, value-added trends, and the Chinese EV quota.
Limit: The autos report combines USTR analysis with cited industry estimates and stakeholder positions. Non-renewal at the first review is not immediate termination.
Source · International Monetary Fund
Published 01 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 01 JUL 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Reports the US dollar at 57.13 percent and the renminbi at 1.99 percent of allocated official foreign-exchange reserves in 2026’s first quarter.
Limit: Exchange-rate valuation affects quarterly shares, some reserves are unallocated, and reserve composition is only one measure of currency use.
Source · International Monetary Fund
Published JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published JUL 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Finds wider 2025 current-account imbalances and identifies Chinese and US domestic imbalances among principal drivers.
Limit: A current account is saving minus investment across the economy, not a bilateral goods balance.
Source · Global Energy Monitor
Published JUL 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published JUL 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Supplies the unit-level coal project status data used in the CREA/GEM report.
Limit: Project classifications depend on sourced records and periodic updates; proposal, permit, construction, operation, and retirement are distinct states.
Source · Matt Sheehan
Published JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published JUL 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Provides specialist context for reading the address as institution-building rather than a standalone technology announcement.
Limit: Analysis is interpretive and is not substituted for the official text.
Source · US Energy Information Administration
Published 23 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 23 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Describes Saudi East–West and UAE Habshan–Fujairah pipeline capacity after the Saudi expansion.
Limit: Stated capacity and export capacity do not establish available or realized throughput during the crisis.
Source · Coalition for a Prosperous America
Published 22 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 22 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The monitor estimates a $70 billion tariff-collection gap, assigns $66 billion to structural leakage and $4 billion to third-country transshipment, and estimates $724 million for Canada and Mexico combined.
Limit: This is an advocacy organization's statistical model, not an official customs determination. Its $14 billion exposure screen, $4 billion estimated revenue effect, and $70 billion total gap are different measures and must not be added or assigned to Canada.
Source · United States Census Bureau
Published 17 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 17 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Reports a July 2025 US population of about 341.8 million and roughly 1.8 million annual growth, including 1.3 million net international migration. This Notebook sums official single-year ages into three comparable display bands.
Limit: The three displayed age shares are Mainland Dispatch calculations from Census estimates; NBS and Census definitions and reference periods are not identical.
Source · Federal Reserve Board staff
Published 05 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 05 JUN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The authors estimate direct Chinese transshipment at less than one percentage point of Mexico's US export gains and Chinese-linked production or processing at about 14 percentage points.
Limit: The study concerns Mexico, not Canada; uses trade, input-output, and FDI data rather than firm ownership or customs files; and describes its estimates as informative bounds.
Source · OECD
Published JUN 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published JUN 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Projects 4.5 percent growth for 2026 and discusses industrial strength, property adjustment, precautionary saving, policy support, investment composition, and external risks.
Limit: The forecast precedes the July releases and is conditional on stated assumptions. It is an institutional interpretation, not a July measurement.
Source · US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Published JUN 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published JUN 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Shows that manufacturing output, labor hours, productivity, employment, and GDP share are different measures.
Limit: Aggregate indexes do not answer every question about physical volume, quality, value added, or regional jobs.
Source · Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Published 29 MAY 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 29 MAY 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Documents the higher-base export expansion, record goods surplus, product composition, and changing destinations.
Limit: Export share, surplus dollars, and surplus as a share of rest-of-world GDP use different denominators.
Source · IMF Finance & Development
Published 29 MAY 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 29 MAY 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Argues that conventional models omit tariff-induced relocation and that tariffs are a practical source-targeted tool.
Limit: The author's policy argument is explicitly not IMF policy.
Source · Centre for European Reform
Published MAY 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published MAY 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Connects weak demand, property, industrial support, import substitution, currency, exports, and German exposure.
Limit: A strong Germany-focused policy argument, not a settled causal decomposition.
Source · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Published 27 APR 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 27 APR 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Estimates 2025 military expenditure at $954 billion for the United States and $336 billion for China, respectively 33 and 12 percent of the world total.
Limit: China’s value is estimated. Spending is not a direct measure of readiness, alliance capacity, force location, or combat effectiveness.
Source · UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders and other UN experts
Published 20 APR 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Published 20 APR 2026 · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
The experts raised pre-verdict concerns about the clarity of unlawful means, prolonged pretrial detention, defense preparation, and the law's effects on expression, assembly, association, legality, and proportionality.
Limit: The communication predates the verdict, reports allegations, and notes a government reply. The host page says it is not managed by OHCHR, while linking the full official communication and response records.
Source · The Arctic Institute
Published 15 APR 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Published 15 APR 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Expert discussion of operating economics, ice conditions, Russian administration, and China–Russia interdependence.
Limit: Interpretation source; it does not verify Sea Legend's individual 2026 sailings.
Source · International Monetary Fund
Published 06 APR 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 06 APR 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Finds modest and uncertain aggregate current-account effects from tariffs relative to saving, investment, fiscal, and consumption policies.
Limit: The macro finding does not deny sector-specific tariff effects.
Source · PBS · Amanpour & Company
Published APR 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Published APR 2026 · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
A captioned 17-minute expert interview on the energy shock and China–Russia incentives.
Limit: An April analytical snapshot, not a source for August vessel movements or completed Arctic voyages.
Source · JAMA
Published 26 MAR 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 26 MAR 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Finds China’s share of global early-stage biopharma programs rose from 8.0 percent in 2015 to 32.3 percent in 2024, near the US share of 37.4 percent.
Limit: Uses proprietary Cortellis data, attributes origin by company headquarters, covers discovery through phase 2, and does not evaluate program quality or approval.
Source · Government of Canada and Canada China Business Council
Published 04 MAR 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 04 MAR 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The sources put 2025 two-way merchandise trade near C$124 billion to C$125 billion. The institutional report gives 4.9% total growth and 13.8% Canadian-export growth; a later federal page gives 5.2% and 14.7%.
Limit: The differing totals reflect dataset, basis, timing, or revision choices. These figures document scale and growth, not causation, intent, origin fraud, or the direction of any specific shipment.
Source · US Energy Information Administration
Published 03 MAR 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 03 MAR 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Supplies the 20.9-million-b/d first-half 2025 Hormuz baseline, global share, and LNG exposure.
Limit: Aggregate route estimates do not identify vessel tracks or establish complete closure on a given day.
Source · National Snow and Ice Data Center
Published MAR 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published MAR 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Records a March 15 maximum of 14.29 million square kilometres, tied with 2025 for the satellite-era low.
Limit: NSIDC explicitly cautions that the winter maximum does not predict the September minimum.
Source · Brookings Institution
Published MAR 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published MAR 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The 2025 analysis says evidence of circumvention was mainly through Mexico, with some evidence through Canada, while its high-level and product sections found little or no direct Canada transshipment in several categories. The later report says 2025 data showed little sign of redirection to Canada or Mexico and records a 3.2% rise in China's exports to Canada against 5.5% overall export growth.
Limit: The analyses use aggregate and product-level trade patterns rather than customs adjudications. They can constrain an economy-wide narrative but cannot disprove a hidden shipment, firm, or product corridor.
Source · National Bureau of Statistics of China
Published 28 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 28 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Reports a 2025 population of 1.40489 billion, a 3.39 million annual decline, 7.92 million births, 11.31 million deaths, and official age-band shares.
Limit: This is an official PRC statistical release under national definitions. Its series interests and coverage should not be assumed identical to Census measures.
Source · International Monetary Fund
Published 25 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 25 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Expects tariffs to raise US prices and lower output while the current-account deficit remains large.
Limit: A preliminary IMF staff view rather than a final Executive Board report.
Source · ChinaPower · Center for Strategic and International Studies
Published 20 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Published 20 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Documents 101 senior officers purged or potentially purged since 2022 and separates the observable count from competing explanations.
Limit: The database includes officers assessed as potentially purged and cannot by itself establish motive.
Source · International Monetary Fund
Published 18 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 18 FEB 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Assesses property adjustment, weak demand, exchange rates, exports, excess supply in some sectors, and social-policy reform.
Limit: IMF staff and Board assessment includes a Chinese Executive Director statement and areas of disagreement.
Source · CREA and Global Energy Monitor
Published FEB 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published FEB 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Provides prior-year context for the coal construction pipeline and commissioning surge.
Limit: Proposals are not operating capacity, gross commissioning is not net fleet growth, and neither proves future utilization.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published FEB 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published FEB 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Reports 19.87 million b/d through Hormuz in 2025, Asia's exposure, LNG share, and estimated available bypass capacity.
Limit: Available alternative capacity is not the same measure as pipeline nameplate or stated export capacity.
Source · International Monetary Fund
Published 28 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 28 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Analyzes property adjustment, domestic demand, disinflation, household wealth, saving, local-government finance, trade, and rebalancing with country and provincial evidence.
Limit: The report uses an earlier data cutoff, institutional judgments, and model-based estimates. It supplies mechanisms and context, not a direct reading of July 2026.
Source · Associated Press
Published 24 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 24 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
AP reported the president's threat of a 100% tariff and his warning that Canada could become a route for Chinese goods after the January Canada-China arrangement.
Limit: This establishes a public political warning reported from a social-media post. It is not a customs finding, implemented tariff action, or verified account of Canadian origin practices.
Source · Prime Minister of Canada
Published 16 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 16 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The January release calls the relationship a new strategic partnership and says Canada would allow up to 49,000 China-origin EVs in the first year at the 6.1% MFN rate. The March record says China suspended tariffs on canola meal, peas, lobster, and crab and reduced the combined canola-seed rate to 14.9% from almost 85%.
Limit: Canadian admission does not confer Canadian origin for US customs purposes and is not evidence that any covered vehicle was later transshipped.
Source · Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Published 13 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Published 13 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Records Rudd’s 2023–2026 ambassadorship and work on AUKUS, critical minerals, and technology cooperation.
Limit: An official account of service and achievements, not an independent evaluation.
Source · European Commission
Published 12 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 12 JAN 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Records definitive countervailing duties of 7.8%-35.3% and criteria for price undertakings.
Limit: A product-specific EU finding is not proof that all Chinese exports or support are equivalent.
Source · Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Reports a 2.7 percent aggregate gap between leading US and Chinese models in March 2026 and $285.9 billion versus $12.4 billion in measured 2025 private AI investment.
Limit: Composite benchmark results vary by task. The private-investment series understates Chinese public guidance capital and is not total national financing.
Source · Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Supports the 2.7% March 2026 estimate for the leading US–China model-performance gap.
Limit: A composite benchmark gap does not establish equal performance, cost, safety, or reliability on every task.
Source · Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Supplies selected benchmark and private-investment indicators for an AI competition scenario.
Limit: A benchmark and private-investment measure do not establish ecosystem parity or a labor shock.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Forecasts 5.5 percent China electricity-demand growth in 2026 compared with 5.2 percent in 2025.
Limit: A forecast, not an observed full-year result and not a causal estimate for the H1 mix.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Assesses how scale manufacturing lowers clean-technology costs while concentrating supply and prompting localization.
Limit: Historical observations and 2035 scenarios must remain separate.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Places about 85 percent of solar-PV supply-chain production capacity and 80 percent of lithium-ion battery capacity in China, with still higher shares at selected stages.
Limit: Capacity is not actual production, utilization, installed generation, profitability, or control of every upstream technology.
Source · International Mathematical Union
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Controls the award citations and supports the precise nationality framing.
Limit: The award record does not by itself explain the institutional causes of either mathematician’s work.
Source · International Monetary Fund
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Decomposes Germany's China trade deterioration across Chinese demand and productivity, property, energy, exchange rates, products, and localization.
Limit: The IMF found limited 2025 evidence of a large US-tariff diversion surge into Germany.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 01 SEP 2026
Reports that China coal-fired generation fell about 1.5 percent in 2025 while almost 80 GW of coal capacity was commissioned.
Limit: Annual 2025 context, not an H1 2026 measurement and not interchangeable with the CREA/GEM first-half change.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Reports nearly 22 million electric cars produced in 2025, with China making nearly three quarters and more than four fifths of battery cells.
Limit: Production, capacity, sales, trade, ownership, and deployment are distinct measures and are kept separate.
Source · International Energy Agency
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Reports Chinese electric-vehicle production, domestic demand, exports, destinations, and localization.
Limit: Production, capacity, demand, exports, overseas sales, brands, and headquarters are distinct scopes.
Source · University of Chicago · NYU · IHES
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Documents the institutions in which the mathematicians’ research and careers developed outside China.
Limit: Institutional biographies identify affiliations and milestones; they do not allocate causal credit among countries or universities.
Source · Peking University
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Documents the mathematicians’ connections to Peking University and their early educational paths.
Limit: An alumni account naturally emphasizes the university’s contribution and is read alongside international institutional records.
Source · Rosatom
Published 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Reports 37.02 million tonnes of total cargo on the Northern Sea Route in 2025.
Limit: Rosatom administers the route; its total-cargo series is broader than international transit and carries institutional incentives.
Source · European Central Bank
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Separates cheaper Chinese inputs from final-goods competition and models aggregate gains alongside longer-run scarring.
Limit: Econometrics use 2000-22 exposure; later results are simulations with explicit shock scaling.
Source · National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics · National Science Board
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 2026 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Estimates China at $1.028 trillion and the US at $1.009 trillion in PPP-comparable 2024 R&D, and documents China’s publication-volume lead alongside continuing US citation and collaboration advantages.
Limit: The 2024 R&D estimates are preliminary and revisable. Quantity, impact, collaboration, and field mix are separate dimensions.
Source · Bank for International Settlements
Published 17 DEC 2025 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Published 17 DEC 2025 · Retrieved 29 AUG 2026
Uses household Alipay transactions and survey information to estimate heterogeneous relationships between house prices and consumption across larger and smaller Chinese cities and demographic groups.
Limit: The transaction data run from 2017 to early 2023, estimates vary by city tier and group, and the authors' views do not necessarily represent the BIS. It is not a July 2026 estimate.
Source · Bellona Environmental Transparency Center
Published 15 DEC 2025 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 15 DEC 2025 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Identifies 100 sanctioned or shadow vessels operating on the NSR in 2025, compared with 13 in its 2024 analysis.
Limit: Bellona is an advocacy organization using an open-source methodology; sanctions date, ownership, and voyage evidence require vessel-level review.
Source · United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Published 20 NOV 2025 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 20 NOV 2025 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Estimates China at 32.0 percent and the United States at 15.0 percent of global manufacturing value added in 2024; China was 2.8 percent in 1990.
Limit: Value added is a modeled economic series and does not by itself measure physical output, ownership, resilience, productivity, or technology content.
Source · US Department of the Treasury
Published 12 NOV 2025 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 12 NOV 2025 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Names 32 people and entities and details procurement of hundreds of metric tonnes of specified propellant ingredients from China for PCI.
Limit: A US sanctions designation is an executive-branch finding, not a judicial verdict or proof of top-level PRC direction.
Source · International Federation of Robotics
Published 25 SEP 2025 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 25 SEP 2025 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Reports China installed 295,000 industrial robots in 2024, 54 percent of the global total, and operated more than two million; the US installed 34,200 and operated about 393,700.
Limit: Installation counts do not measure utilization, productivity, robot quality, or output per worker.
Source · Department of Finance Canada
Published 31 JUL 2025 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 31 JUL 2025 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Canada's current summary records 25% surtaxes on listed Chinese steel and aluminum from October 2024 and, from July 31, 2025, on selected non-US imports containing steel melted and poured or aluminum smelted and cast in China.
Limit: The measures include product scope, ordering, and exemptions. They show that Canada adopted China-linked origin controls; they do not establish compliance in every entry or the later durability of the policy.
Source · Hudson Institute
Published 19 FEB 2025 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 19 FEB 2025 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The automatically generated transcripts show Yu arguing in February and March 2025 that China could exploit tariff differences and USMCA access through Canada and Mexico.
Limit: The pages are dated 2025, not 2026, and both warn that their transcripts are automatically generated and lightly edited. They establish continuity in Yu's published analysis, not exact wording in episode 195.
Source · ChinaTalk
Published 27 NOV 2024 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 27 NOV 2024 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
ChinaTalk's annotated translation of a 2024 interview records DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng discussing architectural efficiency, open releases, recruiting, price competition, and the lab's focus on foundational research.
Limit: Annotated translation of a 36Kr/Waves interview. Preserve the original interview date and distinguish Liang's account from translator notes.
Source · China Books Review
Published 17 OCT 2024 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Published 17 OCT 2024 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Blanchette compares Rudd’s Marxism-centered account with Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung’s emphasis on Leninist organization, regime security, and Party-centered nationalism. A separate FISC review directly questions how Rudd infers belief from public rhetoric.
Limit: The FISC essay is an explicit critique, not a neutral adjudication between the competing models.
Source · Government of Canada
Published 26 AUG 2024 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
Published 26 AUG 2024 · Retrieved 30 AUG 2026
The records establish Canada's 2024 EV and metals surtaxes, China's March 2025 retaliatory tariffs on selected Canadian exports, and the March 2026 implementation of reciprocal market-access changes.
Limit: The sequence documents policy pressure and concessions. It does not independently prove Beijing's political intent, Canada's motive, or any later US customs violation.
Source · Meta AI
Published 23 JUL 2024 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 23 JUL 2024 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Meta released the 405-billion-parameter Llama 3.1 model in July 2024 alongside a broader ecosystem pitch covering clouds, inference providers, distillation, safety tools, and a proposed Llama Stack interface.
Limit: Primary artifact for the 405B release, license change, ecosystem partners, and Meta's disclosed evaluation claims.
Source · World Trade Organization
Published JUL 2024 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published JUL 2024 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Summarizes member praise and concerns about transparency, overcapacity, state-owned firms, procurement, and import substitution.
Limit: Member views are not WTO adjudication that every concern is proved.
Source · UN Trade and Development
Published 22 FEB 2024 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Published 22 FEB 2024 · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Provides the 2023 estimate that 22% of global seaborne container trade passed through Suez.
Limit: A 2023 global container share is a baseline, not an August 2026 route-volume measure.
Source · The State Council of the People’s Republic of China
Published 01 FEB 2024 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Published 01 FEB 2024 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Shows the official emphasis on technological breakthroughs, industrial transformation, and productivity.
Limit: Evidence of a stated priority, not proof of implementation or economic effect.
Source · Oxford University Press / University of Oxford
Published 2024 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Published 2024 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
The book develops the interview’s thesis from Rudd’s 2022 Oxford dissertation and provides the longer textual case for “Marxist nationalism.”
Limit: An extended interpretive argument by the interview guest, not independent corroboration of his thesis.
Source · Annual Review of Economics
Published SEP 2023 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published SEP 2023 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Reviews aggregate gains, winners and losers, manufacturing-employment attribution, and trade-war welfare and employment findings.
Limit: Later policy and technology conditions differ from the reviewed episodes.
Source · Meta AI
Published 18 JUL 2023 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 18 JUL 2023 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Meta's July 2023 announcement made Llama 2 weights and starting code available for research and most commercial uses through a custom community license.
Limit: Controlling release announcement. Review the license separately before repeating Meta's open-source terminology.
Source · Cyberspace Administration of China
Published 13 JUL 2023 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Published 13 JUL 2023 · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Supports the description of binding political-content obligations for public generative-AI services in China.
Limit: The inquiry does not generalize these service rules to every research model, private deployment, or overseas use.
Source · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published 27 JUN 2023 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 27 JUN 2023 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Finds nearly 20,000 scientists of Chinese descent left the United States for all destinations between 2010 and 2021, with departures rising sharply and China becoming a more common destination.
Limit: Bibliometric affiliation changes are not perfect measures of citizenship, motivation, or permanent migration; the study does not say all 20,000 moved to China.
Source · United States International Trade Commission
Published 15 MAR 2023 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published 15 MAR 2023 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Finds lower affected imports, higher affected US production, higher prices, and tariff costs borne primarily by importers in 2018-21.
Limit: Directly affected sectors only, not a complete welfare or current-account assessment.
Source · The State Council of the People’s Republic of China
Published 25 OCT 2022 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Published 25 OCT 2022 · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Links complete reunification to national rejuvenation while stopping short of announcing a 2049 invasion or unification deadline.
Limit: The official text establishes a stated political objective, not a timetable or evidence that reunification has been completed.
Source · US Department of Commerce
Published 09 AUG 2022 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 09 AUG 2022 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Records the signing and stated industrial, research, workforce, and national-security purposes of the CHIPS and Science Act.
Limit: Signing establishes authority and intent. Awards, construction, workforce development, and output require separate implementation evidence.
Source · Rest of World
Published 12 JUL 2022 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Published 12 JUL 2022 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Interviews with laid-off employees and recruiters document the collision of the internet-sector slowdown, regulatory change, zero-COVID disruption, and disillusionment with 996 work culture.
Limit: Worker-centered period account; already queued as d-030.
Source · World Bank and Development Research Center of China’s State Council
Published 2022 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 2022 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Provides a documented retrospective on reform and opening from 1978 and the iterative institutional changes behind China’s economic transformation.
Limit: A retrospective co-produced with a Chinese state research body has an institutional perspective and does not attribute every outcome to one reform.
Source · Rest of World
Published 01 NOV 2021 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Published 01 NOV 2021 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
A 2021 essay follows the global appeal of Li Ziqi's pastoral videos into rural-revitalization policy, influencer management, e-commerce, labor, and a dispute over control of her brand.
Limit: Culture and platform-economy backfile; already queued as d-029.
Source · Rest of World
Published 11 MAY 2021 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 11 MAY 2021 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Alpaca owners described livestream blocks that appeared to classify their pets as protected wildlife, exposing the uncertain boundary between safety policy, automated moderation, and creator income.
Limit: Reviewed field reporting; platform-scale claims remain bounded.
Source · ChinaFile
Published 17 SEP 2020 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Published 17 SEP 2020 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
A 2020 account of LGBTQ organizers using the Civil Code comment period, family language, litigation, and personal stories to press for marriage equality despite legal defeat and tightening constraints.
Limit: Dated social-policy backfile; already queued as d-027.
Source · Sixth Tone
Published 04 MAY 2019 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 04 MAY 2019 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
A reported visit to Taoist and Buddhist recluses in the Zhongnan Mountains, where urban disillusionment, revived religious life, environmental enforcement, and unsafe informal housing converge.
Limit: Reviewed culture reporting with a bounded participant sample.
Source · Made in China Journal
Published 07 JUL 2018 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Published 07 JUL 2018 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Fieldwork from the Pearl River Delta examines competing claims that industrial automation either displaces workers or creates better jobs, with attention to bargaining power and vocational training.
Limit: Fieldwork-led labor perspective; already queued as d-025.
Source · Office of the United States Trade Representative
Published 15 JUN 2018 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 15 JUN 2018 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Documents the US tariff decision following the Section 301 technology-transfer and intellectual-property investigation.
Limit: This is the US government’s legal and policy framing; it is not an independent adjudication of every allegation or tariff effect.
Source · Sixth Tone
Published 23 NOV 2017 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 23 NOV 2017 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
A short report on photographer Yang Wenbin's documentary project about hierarchy, authority, and blocked access inside a university student council.
Limit: Reviewed bounded account of student governance.
Source · Sixth Tone
Published 18 JUN 2017 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 18 JUN 2017 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
A 2017 game jam used visual-development tools and college-entrance-exam prompts to make branching stories about education, inequality, apps, family pressure, and public life.
Limit: Reviewed culture and education reporting.
Source · ChinaFile
Published 12 MAY 2016 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Published 12 MAY 2016 · Retrieved 21 JUL 2026
Thomas Mullaney traces claims that Chinese writing is technologically unfit for modern life back to older orientalist hierarchies of language and civilization.
Limit: Historical argument about technological fitness and orientalism; already queued as d-022.
Source · National Bureau of Economic Research
Published JAN 2016 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Published JAN 2016 · Retrieved 26 AUG 2026
Documents slow, concentrated local adjustment, wages, participation, unemployment, job churn, and lifetime-income effects.
Limit: Historical US evidence does not mechanically forecast today's sectors or countries.
Source · State Council of the People’s Republic of China
Published 08 MAY 2015 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 08 MAY 2015 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Records the national plan to upgrade advanced manufacturing, innovation, quality, digital integration, and green production.
Limit: A policy plan establishes aims and mechanisms, not independent evidence of delivery or sole causation.
Source · ChinaFile
Published 24 DEC 2012 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
Published 24 DEC 2012 · Retrieved 22 JUL 2026
A period snapshot of Baidu trends ranging from the Bo Xilai scandal and food-safety rumors to restaurant logos, viral television moments, and the rise of diaosi self-mockery.
Limit: Reviewed historical backfile source with period-specific ranking limits.
Source · World Trade Organization
Published 11 DEC 2001 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 11 DEC 2001 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Establishes China’s December 11, 2001 WTO membership and links the accession documentation.
Limit: Membership is a historical hinge, not a complete causal account of China’s manufacturing expansion or later trade conflict.
Source · Office of the Historian, US Department of State
Published 15 DEC 1978 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 15 DEC 1978 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Records the US announcement that formal diplomatic relations with the PRC would begin January 1, 1979.
Limit: A US primary record establishes the American position and timing, not the entire bilateral history.
Source · United Nations
Published 25 OCT 1971 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Published 25 OCT 1971 · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Establishes the 1971 decision on China’s representation at the United Nations.
Limit: The text is used only for the institutional representation decision, not to resolve later legal or political disputes about Taiwan.
Source · Hong Kong Department of Justice
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
The page reproduces the English reference text: Article 22 covers force, threat of force, or other unlawful means used for listed subversion acts; Article 23 criminalizes inciting, assisting, or abetting Article 22 conduct and sets penalty bands.
Limit: The authentic statutory text is Chinese, the English is for reference, and the Department says its annotations are not legal advice or a complete statement of current law.
Source · National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Torigian’s “idealistic pragmatist” description complicates a simple causal story from Xi’s family suffering to ideological rigidity.
Limit: Biographical interpretation can complicate a causal account, but it does not prove an exclusive explanation for Xi's later choices.
Source · Council on Foreign Relations
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 18 AUG 2026
Develops the swing-consumer thesis and an oil-price counterfactual around China's import flexibility.
Limit: The price effect is an analytical counterfactual, not a directly observed component of the benchmark price.
Source · Centre for High North Logistics
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Distinguishes transit cargo, voyage count, container-ship transits, direction, and commodity mix.
Limit: CHNL notes differences between its estimates and Rosatom's figures; both depend on public vessel and cargo records.
Source · Hudson Institute
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Establishes Yu’s policy background and the center’s stated mission of developing American responses to the China challenge.
Limit: Organizational self-description supplies perspective, not independent validation of the episode’s claims.
Source · Xinhua
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 28 JUL 2026
Shows that authorities published response information and that the reviewed enforcement cases predated Noul’s landfall.
Limit: State-media publication does not prove complete or independent reporting; the enforcement allegations were not independently adjudicated here.
Source · Office of the United States Trade Representative
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
USTR states that rules of origin determine whether a good qualifies for preferential FTA treatment. USMCA Chapters 4 and 5 provide origin and origin-procedure rules, with product-specific requirements in the annexes.
Limit: This Notebook does not perform a vehicle-specific regional-value-content calculation or decide an entry without a shipment and production record.
Source · International Maritime Organization
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Explains MARPOL regulation 43A, its July 2024 start, ship-design provisions, exceptions, and coastal-state waivers through 2029.
Limit: The rule page does not quantify route-wide HFO consumption or model spill consequences.
Source · Central Intelligence Agency
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 23 JUL 2026
The primary public record for Burns’s statement that a 2027 readiness instruction is not evidence of a decision to invade.
Limit: A public statement by the U.S. intelligence chief; the underlying intelligence is not disclosed.
Source · Office of the United States Trade Representative
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 25 AUG 2026
Article 32.10 requires notice and review around a party's free-trade agreement with a non-market country and permits the other parties to terminate USMCA on six months' notice after such an agreement enters.
Limit: It is not Article '3.2.10,' and it is not the product-specific origin rule for a particular EV or component.
Source · Bellona Environmental Transparency Center
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Counts 1,312 permits for 975 vessels in 2024, including 100 non-Russian-flagged vessels and a substantial non-ice-class subset.
Limit: Permit issuance does not prove a completed voyage; this 100-vessel category is not Bellona's later shadow-fleet count.
Source · National Snow and Ice Data Center
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 20 AUG 2026
Explains the broad July–October passage window, mid-September optimum, and persistent local ice risk.
Limit: Climatological guidance does not certify conditions for a particular vessel or voyage.
Source · World Bank
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Publication date not stated · Retrieved 14 AUG 2026
Reports 2025 nominal GDP of approximately $19.5 trillion for China and $30.8 trillion for the United States, with respective growth rates of 5.0 and 2.2 percent.
Limit: Current-dollar GDP moves with exchange rates and is not interchangeable with the PPP-adjusted R&D series.
ChinaTalk's annotated translation of a 2024 interview records DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng discussing architectural efficiency, open releases, recruiting, price competition, and the lab's focus on foundational research.
The interview is unusually informative because it is contemporaneous and first-person, but it remains a founder explaining his own company. Claims about costs, motives, technical gaps, and long-term strategy require comparison with papers, releases, hiring, and business behavior.
Why it matters: It replaces retrospective mythology with a dated record of how one Chinese lab understood its constraints and ambitions before R1 became a global market event.
deepseek · liang-wenfeng · translation · open-weights · China
Meta released the 405-billion-parameter Llama 3.1 model in July 2024 alongside a broader ecosystem pitch covering clouds, inference providers, distillation, safety tools, and a proposed Llama Stack interface.
The release is both a technical artifact and interested platform strategy. Meta's capability, cost, and safety comparisons are first-party claims; its partner list and license changes are records that can be checked directly.
Why it matters: The strongest comparison with China's model ecosystem is not open versus closed by nationality, but how durable each firm's incentives are to keep weights, tools, and derivative rights available.
llama-3-1 · open-weights · platform-strategy · United States
Meta's July 2023 announcement made Llama 2 weights and starting code available for research and most commercial uses through a custom community license.
Meta repeatedly called the release open source, but the license included use restrictions and a large-platform condition. The historically accurate description is an unusually broad open-weight release, not an unqualified open-source baseline.
Why it matters: Chinese labs did not invent open-weight distribution. Llama 2 shows that a major American platform company pursued the same ecosystem strategy before the present US–China framing hardened.
llama-2 · open-weights · model-licenses · United States
Interviews with laid-off employees and recruiters document the collision of the internet-sector slowdown, regulatory change, zero-COVID disruption, and disillusionment with 996 work culture.
The article is a period account, not a permanent verdict on Chinese technology. Its lasting value is the workers' shift in imagination: from private-sector prestige and upside toward stability, civil-service exams, and relief at leaving punishing jobs.
Why it matters: Industry cycles change social aspirations as well as balance sheets; the meaning of a desirable career can reverse within a generation.
996 · labor · tech-workers · layoffs · China · Shanghai · Shenzhen
A 2021 essay follows the global appeal of Li Ziqi's pastoral videos into rural-revitalization policy, influencer management, e-commerce, labor, and a dispute over control of her brand.
The strongest tension is not authenticity versus fakery. The fantasy is culturally meaningful and commercially engineered at the same time, with countryside imagery circulating through urban capital and global platforms.
Why it matters: A culture story can also be an infrastructure story about who owns a creator's audience, labor, products, and political legibility.
li-ziqi · rural-life · creator-economy · platforms · Sichuan · China
Alpaca owners described livestream blocks that appeared to classify their pets as protected wildlife, exposing the uncertain boundary between safety policy, automated moderation, and creator income.
This sounds like a novelty story until the enforcement mistake cuts off a livestream business. It is an unusually clear, small-scale example of how platform rules become economic policy for creators.
Why it matters: Content moderation is experienced through edge cases: a defensible wildlife policy can still become arbitrary when classification, appeals, and income are coupled at platform scale.
douyin · content-moderation · creator-economy · alpacas · China · Hangzhou · Guangdong
A 2020 account of LGBTQ organizers using the Civil Code comment period, family language, litigation, and personal stories to press for marriage equality despite legal defeat and tightening constraints.
The article captured a real opening without pretending it guaranteed a breakthrough. Read today, the hopeful headline should remain tied to its publication date and to the setbacks the author documented in the same piece.
Why it matters: It records how advocates worked through official procedures and culturally legible ideas of family rather than reducing Chinese LGBTQ politics to either silence or inevitable progress.
lgbtq · marriage · civil-code · advocacy · China
A reported visit to Taoist and Buddhist recluses in the Zhongnan Mountains, where urban disillusionment, revived religious life, environmental enforcement, and unsafe informal housing converge.
The piece resists making retreat purely romantic. Smartphones, demolished temples, registration offices, tourism, health, and genuine danger remain part of the modern hermit's landscape.
Why it matters: Tradition survives through contemporary institutions and pressures, not outside them; even withdrawal from modern life produces new negotiations with the state and market.
taoism · buddhism · religion · subculture · Zhongnan Mountains · Shaanxi · China
Fieldwork from the Pearl River Delta examines competing claims that industrial automation either displaces workers or creates better jobs, with attention to bargaining power and vocational training.
Published before the current generative-AI cycle, the essay is a reminder that automation debates already had a shop floor, subsidy system, and labor politics. Its normative conclusion is openly pro-worker rather than presented as neutral forecasting.
Why it matters: Model-era arguments about technological displacement are incomplete without the older record of factories, local industrial policy, and who captures productivity gains.
automation · labor · manufacturing · made-in-china-2025 · Pearl River Delta · Dongguan · China
A short report on photographer Yang Wenbin's documentary project about hierarchy, authority, and blocked access inside a university student council.
The small scale is the point. Rather than explaining Chinese politics through national institutions, the photographs observe how status and administrative power are rehearsed on a campus.
Why it matters: Everyday organizations can teach authority long before their members enter formal workplaces or government institutions.
photography · universities · student-life · authority · Beijing · Shanghai
A 2017 game jam used visual-development tools and college-entrance-exam prompts to make branching stories about education, inequality, apps, family pressure, and public life.
This is the kind of culture-and-technology story a current-news feed misses: amateur creators used a rigid national ritual as raw material for small, critical, sometimes strange interactive fiction.
Why it matters: Games can function as vernacular social criticism, especially when low-code tools let young creators work outside the professional industry.
gaokao · games · youth-culture · education · China
Thomas Mullaney traces claims that Chinese writing is technologically unfit for modern life back to older orientalist hierarchies of language and civilization.
This is a useful historical interruption to every new claim that a writing system predetermines technological capacity. It is an argument, not a neutral survey, and should be paired with work on how Chinese input methods actually developed.
Why it matters: Language technology is also cultural history: keyboards, input methods, and literacy debates carry assumptions about which societies are imagined as modern.
chinese-language · input-methods · orientalism · history · China
A period snapshot of Baidu trends ranging from the Bo Xilai scandal and food-safety rumors to restaurant logos, viral television moments, and the rise of diaosi self-mockery.
The list is valuable precisely because it is not a clean political chronology. It shows how scandal, consumer anxiety, celebrity, jokes, and suspicion of official accounts occupied the same online attention space.
Why it matters: Old search behavior preserves the texture of an internet moment that contemporary retrospectives tend to flatten into censorship or politics alone.
baidu · internet-culture · search · archive · China
Collected does not mean endorsed. Withheld and rejected candidates remain private editorial memory and are not rendered as public recommendations or evidence.
Canonical source read, claims classified, limitations recorded, and public validation passed.
A Dispatch exists, but unresolved evidence or editorial checks keep it outside public routes.
375 general-China candidates await access, corroboration, or a complete source review.
29 general-China candidates remain privately recorded as duplicates, misleading frames, or unsuitable sources.